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THE EFFECT OF INSlD ER OWNERSHIP
ON FIRMS' FINANCIAL DECISIONS
Gerald R. Jensen

and

Rober/ R . .lolm~on

In the pa,t several years, an increasing empha~is has been placed on the
importance of agency co~ts to a firm', financial decisions. Jensen and Meckling (3] were the first author, to provide a detailed theoretical analysis of
agency costs and the effect~ they may have on a firm'\ operations. Their
analysis ~uggestcd that the proportion of a firm's stock that is controlled
by insiders may influence the firm•~ deci~ions.
In addition to the Jensen and l\kdling theoretical analysis, several empirical analyses have te~ted for the effrct that in\ider owner~hip has on a
firm's financial deci\ions. The result, of these analyse~ have generally supported the \'icw that the le\'el of insider ownership ha, a ,ignifieant effect
on a firm's decision,. In a recent empirical analysis, the lc,el of insider owncr~hip wa, c,en found to affect the return, generated by a firm's stock. While
the empirical ~tudics ha\'e consistently idemified a ~ignificant imider effect,
the reliability of the,e rc~ult~ b open to question for two rea,ons. First, the
findings have in ,omc ca~e, been contradictory. Sc,ond, the insider ownership effects that ha,e been idcmificd may ha,c been the re,ult of an uncontrolled factor, rather than a difference in insider ownership.
The purpo,e of thi, analysis is to re-examine the effect that the h:vel of
in,ider ownership ha, on a firm·~ financial deci,iom and ib return~. In addition, the analysi~ abo examines the i:ffect that insider ownership has on
a firm's investment deci~ion. Pre\ iou, ,tudic, have investigated the effect
in,idcr ownership ha, on a firm', Jcbt and di\idcnd decisions, but have ignored the investment decision.
Thi, study utili1c<; a procedure that is de~igned to O\er,omc ,omc of the
problems a,sociated \\ ith previous analyses. In particular, the paired comparison, methodology is employed in this analysis in an allcmpt to isolate
the effect that the le, cl of in,idcr ownership ha, on a firm. Thi, tc<:hnique
provides an attra<.t1ve 111ca11, of testing for an effect by pairing firms that
arc \Cry similar except for their ,ariable of interest , in thi, case the level of
insider O\\-nership. The matching pro<:es, utilin:d in thi, methodology inncases our rnnfidence that the findings are general, rather than being the
result of an uncontrolled variable and a unique time period.
The results of the analysis suggest that the level of in,idcr owncr,hip has
little, if any, effect on a firm's decisions or its return,. Thi, finding implie,
that the insider effects identified by earlier studies ma y have bcen driven by
an un,ontrollcd variable.

Brief LiteraturC' Review
Rozeff ( 141 found evidence indicating that a firm's level of insider ownership significantly affects the firm's dividend decision. In particular, his em-
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pirica l tests indicate that there is a significant negative re lationship between
a firm's level of insider ownership and the amount of dividends the firm pays.
This finding supports the proposition that closely held firms select dividend
payout levels that allow shareholder~ to more fully reali ze the tax benefits
of capital gains. The finding also supports Rozeff's proposition that with
a lower proportion of outsiders, there is less need to pay dividends to reduce
agency costs.
There is a controversy concerning the effect that insider ownership ha~
on a firm's capital structu re decision. Theories exist that support both positive and negative relationships between a firm's insider ownership and ib
debt level. In addition, the empirical evidence has been mixed on the relationship of the variables.
Leland and Pyle [8) claim that the proportion of stock held by imidcr,
serves a~ a ~ignal of the insider,· optimism about the firm's prospects. A
firm with high insider ownershi p would ~end a positive signal to the market
and thu\ increa,e its debt capacity. The Leland and Pyle hypothesb, therefore, implies a positive relationship between a firm's insider ownership and
its debt level.
Kim and Soren,en (5) propose several hypothe,es that ,upport a positive
relationship berneen the level of insider ownership and a firm's debt level.
The first hypothesis is that closely held firms may i,sue more debt in order
to maintain the insiders' control of the firm . Secondly, debt holder, may be
more willing to lend to closely held firms becaust: they have lower agem;y
cosh of debt . The authors daim that the non-optimal inve~tment agency cost,
idemified by Myers (121. and the wealth transfer agency cost, identified by
Jensen and Meckling [3), may be reduced because bondholder\ fee l that they
can negotiate \\ith insiders to alleviate these cost5. In addition, the bondholders may reel the agency cost5 a re lowered becau,e the O\\ ncr~ of closely
held firm, \\ ill be more accountable for their action~. Lastly. the authors
5ugge,1 that clo~ely held firms may employ more debt because the agency
co,h of o ut,ide equity arc high due to the in<.:entive for manag<.:r~ to consume perks.
Mel can and Angell [ l l) 5ugge5t that the le\ d of insider ownership ~hould
have a negative relatiomhip \\ith the level of debt a firm employs. The authors
note that the cost of bankruptcy for a firm's in5iders is positively related
to the amount of imider ownership. Therefore, firms with high imider ownership will maintain lO\\Cr debt levels to reduce the managcr5· e:-.pcctcd
bankruptcy co~ts.
The incentive for manager, to engage in risk reducing activitie~ beyond
that deemed optimal by a firm's shareholder5 b documented in the fi nance
literature. (see [31) For example, several author~ ha\C argued that manager5
may engage in mergers 10 reduce their risk exposure, e\en at the expense
of shareholders . (sec (I], (3). (91) Furthermore, firms with high insider ownership may be able to engage in ris k reducing activities, suc h a\ diversification
and maintaining a below optimal debt ratio, to a greater extent than other
firms because the threat of an unfriendly takeover by corporate raiders or
outside shareholders is lower due to the high level of control by the managers.
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The evidence relating a firm's level of insider ownership to its risk taking
behavior is extremely limited. The empirical studie, that have been conducted in thi~ area have been confined to the dcht decision. In addition, these
studies have produced contradictory resulb. Specifically, Kim and Sorensen
found a significant positive relatiomhip, \\ hilc Mclean and Angell found
a ~ignificant negative relationship be1ween the level of insider ownership and
the deb1 ratio.
In a recent analy~is by Kim. Lee and Francis [6]. lhe authors identify a
return anomaly a~socia1ed with a firm\ level of in~idcr ownership. Specifi.
cally, the author, find lhat, e\'(:11 after a<ljus1ing for risk, sernrity returns
are po~itivcly relate<l 10 a firm's level of in,idcr ownership. In addition. 1he
author~ find 1ha1 the "insi<ler anomaly" exi~t~ independent of 1he size and
E/ P anomalies.

Sample and Mcthodolog~
The ~ample \\a, obtaine<l by con~i<lering th.: firm, on the Annual Industrial COMPUSTAT Tape to be the population. f'inn<. \\ere ,clccled for inclusion in the ,ample if they reporte<l insider owner,hip informal ion in the
Valudinc ln\e,tment Survey an<l reported the required return data on the
Daily CRSP Tape. '
This analy~is employs a paired comparbom m.::thodology, where pairs are
formed by identifying firms ,,ith very different k,·eb of imider O\\lli:rship.
The firrm an: matd1ed by in<lu~try (four-digit SIC co<le) and ,i,e (10tal a,\dS) to control for any Jiffcrence, attribu1cd 10 these two variables.
The paired comparison~ methodology is an dfo.:rh e way to identify the
impact of a variable \\ hile controlling for other variables. Therefore, the
rewlls obtained from thi, methodology are less sem.iti,c to lhe rime period
analyzed becau~e other factors that may ha\c an cffecl on the firm arc restraine<l. The pairc<l compari,om methodology ha\ been effectively employed
in man) other ,tudics 1hat 11ere undcrtaJ..en 10 idcn1ify the effect of a particular firm characteristic (,ee [4, 7, 10, 13]). /\ dctaile<l <lescriplion of the technique is pro,ided in rreund', ma1hemat ical ~tatisrics tc\t [2].
The analy\iS employed I\\O alternative marching techniques. The first
ml'lho<l applied rather strict rna1ching criteria an<l neared a sample (Sample
I) of 44 pair, of firms. The low insider ownership firms in Sample I have
7lr,o or less in,ider ownership an<l the high insider ownership firms ha"e 20°'0
or more. The minimum clifferen.:c between the 1,10 is l81T'o. In addition, the
Sample I firms ,,ere matched by size with111 each pair. The percentage differ·
cnce between the firms' total a,sets \1as restricted 10 be 100% or less.'
The sccon<l mat.:hing technique applied le~s strict criteria, and produced
a sample (Sample 2) of 65 firms. The low imidcr ownership firms have a
maximum of 9.0l!Jo insider ownership and the high insider ownership firms
have a minimum of 18%. The smallest paired diffcrcnc.:: in in~ider ownership is 160/o . The maximum percentage difference in the firms' total assets
was 1300/o.
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The matching criteria for each sample insured that the pai red firms were
similar except for their levels of insider ownership. The majority of the pairs
for each sample fell well within the established criteria. The high similarity
in size a nd the large divergence in in,ider ownership bet"een the low and
high insider owned firms is illu,tratcd by the 5ummary statbtics reported in
Table I.

I.on and llil!h ln~idrr Firm Data
Sample 1
Sample 2
High lm,ider Lon ln,idcr High ln,idcr Lon ln~idl'r

Insider Owner~hip
Total A~\ets
Number of Com111011 Stod.
Holder,
Number of Firm
Pair,
Number of lndu,tries Repre,entcd

Firm,
Mean

Firm,
\lean

Firm,
Ml'an

Firm~
J\ll'an

38.71

1300

2.82
1359

127R

36.1

3 .0-1
1455

9.R9

20.57

10.26

20.79

-1-1

65

38

55

•Total a~~ch and number of ..:ommon ,harcholdcr, arc rc..:ordcd in million,.
The in,idcr ownership , alues arc recordcd in percentage,.
The time period cl10\en for the analy~is i~ 1984. The in~ider ownership
variable is obtained from the Value Line lnvestmelll Survey for thr year 198-1.
\'alue Line define, an in,idcr to bc a corporate officer, or director. or any
indi,idual who i~ actively imolvcd in the dcd,ion, of the firm. The other
variable, employed in the analy,is arc obtained trom the Annual lndu,trial
COMPUSTAT Tape and the Dail) CRS P Tape.
The following paragraph\ dc\Cribe the financial variables examined in the
st udy . Two altcrnati,c form, of the di, idcncl payout ratro and the debt ratio
arc employed in the analysb. The level of im 1:,tmcnt is measured by a firm's
capital expenditures. The busines~ ris!,_ variable is proxicd by the ~tandard
de,iation of the ratio of operating income to total a\wl~. The beta mca~ure
is obtained from the Value Linc lrn e~cment Survey. The return variable for
each of che finm i~ calculated as the mean daily return for the year. The
rnea urcs employed in the analy~is arc dcserihed in more detail below.
The fir ~t di, idt·nd ratio (D ITA) is calculated a , the ratio of the ..:a~h dividend on common ~to..:i._ to the boot,_ value of total asset,. The second dividend ratio (D101) is ..:omputed by dividing the ca~h d ividend on common
\toc k by operating income.
T he two-debt ratim employ the ~amc debt value. which is equal to the su m
of long-term dcht and s hort-term debt. The ratios differ in that they employ
different equity values. The first debt ratio variable (DRBV) use\ the sum
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of the book value of preferred stock and the book value of common equity
as the equity value. The second debt ratio measure (DRMV) employs an equity value, which is calculated a5 the market value of common stock plus
the book value or preferred stock. Hoth debt ratio mca5ures arc derived by
dividing the debt value by the sum of the appropriate equity value and the
debt value.'
The investment variable([) is mea,ured by a firm's total annual capital
expenditures as a percentage of total a~sets. This \ariablc measures only one
part or a firm's investment decision. the level of investment. The business
risk variable indicates the risk associated with a firm's past imestments. The
business risk variable (HR) is calculated a~ the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to total assets. Ten years of historkal data are utiliLed in deri\ ing this measure.
The beta or each firm's common stock \\a, included in the analysis as an
alternative measure of firm risl.. The beta variable is a combined measure
of a firm's financial risk and its bu,incss rbk. Therefore, a test for a difference in betas is an alternative means of testing for a difference in debt ratios
and business risl.. The beta variable is cal.en from the Value Linc Investment Survey. Value Linc calculates a value \\eighted beta using five years
of \\Cckly data. In addition. Value Linc,· betas arc adjusted for regression
toward the mean.
The return mcasun: employed in the analysb i, obtained from the daily
CRSP tape. and represents the total daily return to a firm', common stock.
The a\eragc daily return is calculated a, the arithmetic mean return o,cr the
253 trading days in I 98~.
After the firm, have been paired, the analysis calculate, a t-,tatistic to test
\\ het her a significant difference exists bet w.:en the financial , ariablcs maintained by high and lo\\ imidcr O\\lled firm,. The I-statistic utilized in the
analy,is is presented below.
T= D - 0
Where,

Sd / n
11

1
1)=__

L

D1

n i= I
and

11

Sd' = _ ,_

L

n-1 i= I

(Di

D)'.

T has a t-clistribution with n - I degrees or freedom. Di represents the
difference between the financial variables maintained by the ith pair or firms.
D is the mean of the paired differences, and Sd is the sta ndard deviation
of the paired differences. The number of pairs is represented by n.
The hypothesis we arc testing is that firms with high insider ownership
have financial characteristics that differ from those with low insider ownership. The paired comparisons I-statistic is the appropriate measure to cm-
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ploy in this situation, since the financial variables mai ntained by firms within
the sam e industry arc very likely to be dependent.
Rei.ults of the Empirical Analy~is
T he data reported in Table 11 suggest, that there is little difference between t he mean levels of debt, dividend~. invc~tment, risk, and return for
the low and high insider owned firms. This observation is confirmed by the
paired comparison test results for Sample I and Sample 2, wh ich arc reported in Tables Ill and IV, respectively . The mean, ~tandard deviation and t·
statistics reported in Tables 11 1 and IV are derived from the differenced data.
The difference~ are calculated as the values for the low insider owneJ firms
minus the value~ for the high insider o~ned firms.

TAHLE II

Low and lligh ln,idcr Firm Stati,tici.
Sampll· I
Sample 2
lligh ln~ider Lon lnsidrr 1-ligh ln~idrr I.on ln,idcr
Firm,
Firm~
Firm,
Firm,
Ml·an
Mean
i\lc·an
Mran

'i

lnvc~tmc111 Ratio
Di\idcnd
Ratio (TA)
Di\ idcnd
Ratio (Oil
Debt
Ratio (B\'l
Debt
Rat io (I\IV)
Bu~inc,,
Ri\1' (BR)
Beta
Dail} Return·'

o.oson
0.01991

0.07954
0.02253

0.15269

0.11501

0.15028

0.29109

0.28452

0.J0902

0.29292

0 .25064

0.26486

0.26243

0.26220

(l.04387

0.04714

0.04471

0 .04572

1.02
0.01314

1.03
0.00470

1.03
0.00946

1.05
0.00042

0.07432
0.01802

0.07968
0.02326

0.11112

·•The daily return mca,111,: is nxordcd in p.:rcentage terms.

·,

The result~ suggc~t that the h::\ el of insider owncr,hip ha, wry little effect
on the financial \J.riables of the firm~. Specifically, in Sample I there \\a,
not a .,tati.,tically significant difference- between the rinm' Ji\ idend payout
ratio~ {t = 1.6 1 and 1.50). det,1 ratios (I= -0.18 ,md 0.40), investment ratios
(t = 0.63), betas (t - 0.25), or their t,u~inc,, ri,k (t=0.37). Thet-stati~tic for
rhc di\ idcnd payout b nearly significant at the 10°·0 lc\el. however the other
\ariahles are not e\en dose 10 being significant. 1-urthermore, the finding,
reported in rablc Ill indicate that the lc.,.cl of insider owner~hip is not significantly related 10 the performance of a firm•, stod (I= -0. 39). The high
insider O\\ ned firms have higher rct urn, on average than the lo\\ in~ider owned
firms, but the Jiffen:nce is far from being ~ignificant.
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TABLE Ill
Paired Comparison Test Results for Sample I

Variable

Differences
Standard
Error

Mt•an

lnvestmen1 Ratio
Dividend Ratio (TA)
Dividend Ratio (01)
Debt Ratio (BY)
Debt Ratio (MV)
Business Ri,k
Beta
Mean Daily Return·

0.00537
0.00525
0.04157
-0.00657
0.01423
0.00327
0.00781
-0.00844

0.00846
0.00351
0.02583
0.03609
0.03579
0.00869
0.03136
0.02187

I-statistic
0.63

I.SO

1.61
- 0.18
0.40
0.37
0.25
-0.39

jMean daily return is recorded in percentage term,.
TABLE IV
Paired Comparison Test Re~ults for Sample 2

Variable
ln\estment Ratio
Di vidend Ratio (TAl
Dividend Ratio (01)
Debt Ratio (BV)
Debt Ratio (l'vf\l)
Business Risi,.
Beta
Mean Daily Rcturnh

Mean
-0.00078
0.00263
0.03528
-0.01609
- 0.00023
0.00100
0.02551
- 0.00009

Differences
Standard
Error

I-statistic

0.00804
0.00282
0.01941
0.02985
0.02930
0.00636
0.03097
0.01437

-0.09
0.93
l.81·'
-0.53
-0.01
0.16
0.82
-0.63

jSignificant at the 10% level.
hMean daily returns is recorded in percentage terms.
The results for Sample 2 are consistent with the results of Sample I, except that one of the dhidend ratios is significant in Sample 2. In particular,
the coefficient on DI0I is positive and significant, which ~upports the findings of Rozeff. However, the other dividend ratio (DITA) is insignificant
in both samples.
Based on this evidence it would appear that a firm's level of insider ownership has little effect on the firm's operations. Specifically, the findings provide limited evidence indicating that the level of insider ownership affects
a firm's dividend payout ratio. However the results provide evidence that
the level of insider ownership does not affect a firm's debt or investment
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decision. In addition, tho.: finding~ provide no evidence to indicate chat the
level of insider ownershir ha~ any effect on the returns 10 a firm's stock.
These finding~ contradict the theory that the level of insider ownership
affects a firm's decisions. Furthermore, the results are contrary 10 the findings of previou~ studies. Specifically, empirical ~tudies have found that insider ownership affect\ a firm•~ debt and dividend decision.
The following paragraph, provide two po,,iblc cxplanation5 for the contradictory results between this analysi\ and rrcvious analyses. Fir5t, this analysis employs a methodology specifically de,igncd to i~olate any effect the lc\el
of insider owner5hip may have on a firm. The analysis employs rather strict
matching requirement,. The firms within a pair have very different level\
of insider ownership, but have the ~ame four-digit SIC code and the ,ame
approximate size. The ~trict matching rcquiremenb improve the reliability
of the results. Specifically, any difference identified cannot be due to the
type of business or the sile of the firm.
Previous analyses have been less rigorous in controlling for the,e factors,
and hence, may ha, e mhtak~n a size or indu~try effect for an imider O\\ nership effect. Roleft I 141 did not cake difference, in tirm si1e or indu,cry into
account when examining firm,' diYidend payout ratios. Kim and Soremen
[51 utilited both ANOVA and regres5ion in studying firm debt ratio, and
controlled for both industry and size difference~. However. their matching
criteria \\a\ by Value" Line indu\try cla,sification, and they did not comidl•r
both factors together. In particular, they failed to control for size difference, in the ANO\" A and industry difference, in the regression analy\i~. Kim,
Lee and Franci~ l61 controlled for firm !\ize but ignort'd industry difference\
when testing for an "in5ider anomaly.'' Finally, ~Id l'an and Angell [ 111
did nm control for firm !\izc or industry when analyzing firm debt ratio,.
The po5sibility that ~ile or indmtry difference, could have affe.:ted 1he
rc\ult, of 1he,c ,tudic, ,ecm, more likely\\ hen one observes the characterbtic~ of high and low insider O\\ner,hip firm,. In partirnlar, !-.mall finm generally have a higher le\ el of in,ider owncr,hip than large firm!\. For example,
in the total sample of firm, from ,,hid1 the pairs \\WC sckctcd, the 1~0 firm!\
\\ilh le,~ than 2°•0 in,idcr owncr,hip had an average of So.86 billion in total
asset~.\\ hile the 98 firm, with more than 25°·0 in~ider ownership had an average of $1.17 billion in total a,,et..,. In addition, ,omc ind mt rie~ comist primarily of firm~ \\ ith high or low levels of insider ownership. For e)l.ample. the
U\'\:ragc level of in,ider owncr,hip within the represented industrie~. ranged
from a lo"' of 1.80/o to a hrgh of 59°·0. 1-urther ,upport of thi, claim is provided by Winl..lcr and Parl..cr 1151. They employed an ANOV A on ownership
concentration and found chat indu5try o,,nership ..:oncentration is significantly different aero~\ indu,trics. If om· failed to control for eitho.:r the size
diffcrem:c or the industry difference, a spuriOU!\ insider effect may be identified.
Second, the methodology employed in thi~ analy.<,i!\ b appropriate for testing
for differences in financial variables bo.:cau.<,c ii con.<,ider, the po!\,iblc dependence between the financial dcci,ions of firms "'ithin the ,amc industry. Analyses that group firms into high and lo,, insider owner,hip categories and
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test for differences in the mean financial ratios of these categories ignore
this dependence.
While the paired comparisons methodology is an effective technique for
controlling for certain factors while testing for differences attributed to the
variable of interest, the technique does have a few limitations. First, to avoid
eliminating too many firms, it is usually necessary to pair the sample on a
relatively few common factors (in this study the common factors were size
and industry). Previous studic~ have suggested that firm financial decisions
are innuenced by several ,ariable~. It is pos~ible that the two common factors employed in the analysis do not capture all the relevant external factors. Second, if one attempts to match firm\ that have very similar
characteristics, except for the \ ariablc of interest, the sample is frequently
constrained to be relatively small and may not be repre~entative of firms in
general.
The limitations of the paired comparisons methodology may innuence the
re~ults of this analy~is; however, their effect is likely to be limited in size.
The data in Table I indicate~ that thi:: \ample of firms is derived from many
different industric~ and rnnsists of a relatively large number or firm~. In addition, the use of four digit SIC cocb in pairing firm~ may alle\ iate problems
v.ith the omi~~ion of relevant variables. In particular, in matching firms by
industry one <.:1111 at lea~I parlially control for several firms specific characteristics that may prodUL:c spuriou\ effect~. In any ca,e, the omission of rcle\ant ,ariable, in 1he analysis is more likely to crea1c a bias toward iden1ifying
an effect that <lid not exist rather 1han 1101 finding an effect that did exist.
In thi s analysis we fi nd 5upport for the proposition tha1 in,ider effects are
insignificant.
Summar:i, am.I Conclu~ion,

This analysis employs a paired compari~ons me1hodology to empirically
test for any effect 1hat a firm• ~ lt~\el of imidcr ownership has on ics dcci,ions and its returns. The re~ults of the analy,is suggesl that once size and
indu5try <lifterencc5 arc conlrollcd, there is not a statbtically ,ignific.:anl differ·
cnc.:c between the finam:ial \ariablcs of high and low insider owned firm~.
Furthermore, ii appear, the le,el or imidcr ownership, by it~elf, does not
affccl the returns of a firm', slOck.
Thcse finding, arc significant becau,e they imply that a firm'5 level of insider owncr,hip has litllc impact on its operations. At the least, the rc,ults
of 1hi~ analysis suggest thal 1he level of imider owncr~hip docs not have a
con,istenl and ~ignifo:ant impact on a firm's decision,. Therefore, it wou ld
appear that the rela1ive lack of attention that insider ownership ha~ received
in analyses of firm decisions may be jus1ified. In addition, 1hc "insider
anomaly" appears to have been driven by some variable other than insider
ownership.
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Endnotes
'The sample excludes financial firms and regu lated fi rms due to the unique
nature of their financial ratios and how their financial decisions arc made.
'The percentage difference in total a ssets was calculated a\ the ab~olute
value of the following ratio:
TA([) - TA(2)
(TA(I) + TA(2))/ 2
Where, TA(i) represents the book value of total assets for firm i.
'The hook value of equity for some firm ~ may as,umc a very ,mall \aluc
or even a negative value. This analysis utili,e, two methods to overcome the
problem created y. hen ~uch a number is included in the divisor of a ratio.
First, the book value debt ratio is calculated with the wm of the book value
of debt and equity in the divisor. Second. the market value of debt ratio is
calculated with the ~um of the book value of debt and the "market" value
of equity in the divi,or.
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